Suchergebnisse

Autonomy generally is a valued condition for persons in liberal
cultures such as the United States. We uphold autonomous agents as
the exemplar of persons who, by their judgment and action, authenticate
the social and political principles and policies that advance their
interests. I will begin by examining the concept of autonomy in
Section II of this essay. In Section III, I will explore the idea
that autonomy is valued because autonomous agents are persons whose
judgment and actions serve to advance their interests in a democratic
society. But the focus of this essay is on the phenomenon, which is
not implausible in a culture such as that of the United States, of
being "blinded" by the ideal of autonomy. What happens if
we value autonomy too much?

The essays in this volume open up reflection on the implications of social inequality for theorizing about moral responsibility. Collectively, they focus attention on the relevance of the social context, and of structural and epistemic injustice, stereotyping and implicit bias, for critically analyzing our moral responsibility practices.

The essays in this volume open up reflection on the implications of social inequality for theorizing about moral responsibility. Collectively, they focus attention on the relevance of the social context, and of structural and epistemic injustice, stereotyping and implicit bias, for critically analyzing our moral responsibility practices.

This book explores the experiences and philosophical work product of mixed race philosophers, as well as possible links between the two. Some books address mixed-race identity, and some anthologies focus on mixed-race identity, but this is the first anthology on the philosophy of mixed-race, and the first anthology by mixed-race philosophers.